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THE ECONOMY AND FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA
LIANG-SHING FAN *
After two decades of the U.S. policy of containment, China and the United
States have entered into a new relationship, occasioned by China's ping pong
diplomacy and the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente. Those developments
make this an auspicious moment 'for reappraisal of China as an economic
entity and as a potential trade partner for this country.
I
AN ECONOMIC PROFILE OF CHINA
A. China's Resources'
China's enormous land (3.7 million square miles) contains many valuable
resources, of which the most important are the human resources. ,Nearly 800
million people crowd the coastal and central regions of China, with a sparsely
populated inner expanse along the Sino-Soviet borders. The literacy rate has
been increasing rapidly as a result of compulsory education, widespread adult
education, and the simplification of Chinese characters. The contribution of
educated manpower to the miracle of economic growth in otherwise resource-
poor Japan demonstrates the promise 800 million educated people hold for
the development of China.
China seems to be self-sufficient in many mineral resources, especially the
coal-iron base. As early as 1965, the P.R.C. produced nearly 300 million tons
of coal, and its output has been increasing ever since. There are more than
seven coal mining areas, each producing between 10 and 20 million tons. The
biggest production center is the Liaoning Province in Manchuria. China has
been a steady supplier of coking coal to Japan since the early 1960's, a re-
lationship likely to continue unless the energy shortage in Japan is alleviated.
Although the absolute volume of oil output is still meager, China has been
virtually self-sufficient in most of its oil needs, so that oil from the Taching
oil field in Manchuria has also been offered to Japan. In addition, China has
been producing millions of tons of shale oil in Manchuria and Kwantung for
many years. Some exchange of technical know-how with the U.S. may soon
be mutually beneficial as the U.S is on the verge of multi-billion dollar shale
exploitation in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah.
In metal production, China's most important iron-steel complex is Ansham
in Manchuria, with a capacity of more than 6 million tons per year. The
central China Wuham center and the Paoton center are two other major complexes.
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Shanghai, the largest industrial city of China, also has a major steel production
facility. Nevertheless, the estimated production of 18 million tons of crude
steel in 1970 is low when compared to major industrial countries, so the
P.R.C. still is importing quality special steels from Japan and East European
countries. As the nation's industrialization continues, China's steel output should
be significantly increased, creating the potential for technological cooperation
with the U.S. in the near future.
China has been an exporter of tin, tungsten, manganese, antimony, mer-
cury, and molybdenum, but the continued exportability of such commodities
depends upon Chinese domestic needs and stockpile policies. China has
experienced shortages of nickel, chromite, and copper in the past.
In nonmetal resources, China produces asbestos and cement 2 for domestic
use. Chemical fertilizer production tripled from 1960 to 1970 to an estimated
7.4 million tons, but fertilizer is still imported from other countries. China
is the world's number two producer of salt, second only to the United States;
Japan generally imports the Chinese surplus.
Finally, the Chinese explosion of nuclear devices can reasonably be assumed
to indicate the production of some radioactive materials in substantial quantity.
B. China's Industrial Production 3
The relative share of national production contributed by the machinery
sector, which is one of the best indicators of industrial development, increased
from 0.13 per cent of total industrial production in 1952 to 20 per cent in
TABLE I
CHINESE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
1949-19704
Year 1949 = 100 Characteristics of Period
1949 100
1950 126 Economic Rehabilitation
1951 168
1952 206
1953 258
1954 295 The First Five-Year Plan
1955 297
1956 368
1957 403
1958 529 The Greap Leap Forward
1959 668
1960 649 - 658 Soviet-Sino Rift (mid-1960)
2 The Fushan Cement Plant in Manchuria uses a by-product of oil shale as raw material, sug-
gesting the possibility of recycling oil shale waste.
' See generally 1 ECONOMIC PROFILE 269; ECONOMic ASSESSMENT 61.
4 Adapted from ECONOmic ASSESSMENT 61-66.
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TABLE I cont.
Year 1949 = 100 Characteristics of Period
1961 430-411
1962 435 - 453
1963 478 - 504 Recovery and Readjustment
1964 535-571
1965 597 - 646
1966 663 - 727
1967 538 - 598
1968 582 - 655 Cultural Revolution and its
1969 686 - 783 Aftermath
1970 801 - 926
TABLE II
CHINESE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
1949-19705
Pre- 1958- 1961- 1967-
Product 1949 (H)* 1949 1957 1960 (H)* 1962 (L)t 1966 1968 (L)t 1970
Electricity 6.0 4.3 19.3 47.0 30.0 47.0 41.0 60.0
(billion KWH)
Coal 62.0 32.4 130.7 300.0 170.0 240.0 190.0 300.0
(million MT$)
Crude Oil 0.3 0.1 1.5 4.6 4.5 10.0 10.0 18.0
(million MT)
Crude Steel 0.9 0.2 5.4 13.0 8.0 13.0 10.0 17.0
(million MT)
Aluminum - - 39.0 80.0 60.0 125.0 145.0 230.0
(thousand MT)
Cement 2.3 0.7 6.9 10.6 5.5 12.0 10.2 13.0
(million MT)
Machine Tools 5.4 1.6 28.3 38.0 25.0 48.0 40.0 50.0
(thousand units)
Trucks - - 7.5 19.4 1.0 47.0 31.0 75.0
(thousand units)
Tractors - - - 10.8 6.7 17.6 15.3 21.0
(thousand units)
Locomotives 22.0 - 167.0 600.0 25.0 140.0 200.0 280.0
(units)
Paper 0.2 0.1 0.9 1.4 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.8
(million MT)
Chemical Fertilizer 0.2 0.03 0.8 2.5 1.4 5.5 4.0 7.0
(million MT)
Cotton Cloth 2.8 1.9 5.1 7.5 4.0 6.0 4.8 7.5
(billion meters)
*(H) High
t(L) Low
*Metric Tons
Adapted from CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PEOPLEs'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ATLAs 69 (1971).
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1970. The machinery sector provides most of China's needs, though its tech-
nical capabilities still lag behind most of the industrialized world, including
Japan. Accordingly, China may be in the market for technical know-how in
the near future.
China's light industry, of which the main subsectors are textiles and food
processing, is one of the economy's slowest growing sectors. Even though its
output more than doubled from 1952 to 1970, its relative share of production
declined from 56 per cent of total industrial output to 29 per cent during the
same period. The decline resulted from P.R.C. policies which concentrated
fuel, power, machinery, and materials for faster industrialization.
In sum, Chinese industrial production has seen great growth as compared
to the pre-communist period. As Tables I and II indicate, however, industrial
policy has been subjected to drastic changes due to political developments
such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
C. China's Transportation System6
When the communists took control of the Chinese government, they in-
herited an underdeveloped and partially destroyed transportation system. Since
then, the P.R.C. has put major emphasis on development of extensive rail-
way and highway systems, as well as the improvement of the inland water-
ways.7 In twenty years, railway mileage increased 80 per cent, highway mileage
600 per cent, and navigable waterways doubled. For long hauls, the railway
is still the dominant means of transportation, but the phenomenal expansion
of the highway network in the West, as between Sinkiang and Tibet, indicates
a Chinese effort to open up the inland sector. Trucking supplements the rail-
way and waterways in the short hauls.
Inland waterways have provided major East-West connections, and there are
many major industrial centers along the Yangtze River. For foreign visitors
who are accustomed to the modern airlines of the West, the Chinese air trans-
portation system is still rather primitive. It has not yet attempted to open
overseas routes, and the number of modem aircraft is still limited. Neverthe-
less, a recent purchase of Boeing 707's and British Tridents may be an indi-
cation of future efforts. The comparative advantage of the U.S. in manufac-
turing airplanes and electronic guidance systems suggests the possibility of
future trade as China's air transportation system develops.
6 For a detailed discussion and evaluation of the transportation network, see Vetterling &
Wagy, China: The Transportation Sector, 1950-71, in ECONOMic ASSESSMENT 147.
7
THE CHINESE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
(Mileage in Kilometers)
Mode of Transportation 1950 1960 1970 1971
Railway (operation) 22,512 33,000 40,000 41,000
Highway (in operation) 99,600 500,000 650,000 NA
Inland Waterway 73,615 168,000 NA NA
(navigable)
Adapted from id. at 178.
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D. China's Agricultural Development8
Incredibly, China's agriculture feeds one-fourth of the world's population
with only seven or eight per cent of the world's cultivated land. Land usage is
very heavy and the marginal product of labor low, so that 80 per cent of the pop-
ulation still depend on agriculture for their livelihood. There is about 0.35 acre
of cultivated land for each person in China as compared with 1.9 acre per
person in the United States. Since the land's salinity makes its reclamation
difficult, the regime has emphasized the intensive cultivation of available land.
Measures such as irrigation system development, flood control, water conserva-
tion, and increased fertilization have been used. Chinese farmers in the South
are the beneficiaries of a climate and annual rainfall which allow three crops
a year, though the fertility of the soils has been degraded by long years of
intensive cultivation.
The agricultural policy of the communist regime can be divided into two
stages: 1949-1961 and the new strategy since 1962. During the first decade of
the regime, primary emphasis was placed upon industrial development, so
that only a minor share of capital investment was directed toward the agricul-
tural sector. Instead, government action concentrated on the socialization of
the agricultural structure through the collectivization of peasant households.
The final stroke of socialization took place during the Great Leap Forward
period with the establishment of "people's communes," which were designed
to be self-sustaining units. They established local industrial plants, managed
all farm supplies, consumer goods distribution, and, most important of all,
the distribution of income for members. By 1964, virtually 99 per cent of Chi-
nese peasants were in communes, which numbered 74,000.
The agricultural output had increased rather slowly, but the policy to "leap
forward" in 1958 by communization and drastic mobilization of the labor force
into overtime work for stepped-up production was an unmitigated disaster.
Stories of thousands of backyard blast furnaces and billions of man days on pub-
lic works were legendary. The commune life was not readily accepted by in-
dividualistic, family oriented Chinese peasants. The resulting lack of incentive,
along with two consecutive years of unfavorable weather, caused disastrous crop
years in 1959-1961.
There was a reversal of policy in 1962, accompanied by more normal weath-
er. Private plots for vegetables and livestock for sale in markets were reacti-
vated. The Tenth Plenum 6f the Chinese Communist Party in 1962 adopted an
"agriculture first" policy which included priority for state investment in the
agricultural sector, an increase in chemical fertilizer imports, greater production
of farm machinery, and importation of grains. Unfortunately, the unexpected
failure of the Summer Reservoir to control the 1963 Yellow River flood in the
North China Plain caused the new strategy to fail. After that setback, another
new policy was developed-to concentrate state investment in the high yield
8 The most comprehensive work in a historical perspective by an American author is D. H.
PERKINS, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, 1368-1968 (1969). This section of the article
is based on Larsen, China's Agriculture Under Communism, in 1 ECONOMIC PROFILE 197; and Erisman,
China: Agricultural Development 1947-71, in 1 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 112.
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farmland of the South. The subsequent Cultural Revolution 6f 1966-1969 did
not threaten agricultural development as much as did Mao's Great Leap For-
ward because the private plots were left intact for material incentive, and other
agriculturally oriented industries kept up their outputs. Since 1970, the People's
Liberation Army has kept the Red Guard from interfering with the policy of
"agriculture first."
As a result of the policy of improving the high yield fields, irrigated lands
increased from 7.6 million hectares to 13 million hectares during 1963-1971,
whereas there had been a meager 1.1 million hectare increase during 1957-1963.
The trend toward high yield farmland is expected to continue until at least one-
third of China's farmland, or 36 million hectares, is irrigated. The irrigation
movement has been accompanied by an increase in the production of pumping
equipment, high yield varieties, rural electric systems, agricultural tools, tractors,
chemical fertilizers, and pesticides.9 The resulting potential for export to the
P.R.C. of plants and chemical fertilizers should not be neglected.
E. Human Resources
1. Population
China's population policy has undergone many modifications in the
past twenty-five years. While the pressure of food production is undoubtedly
important, political factors predominate in this area. Chinese attitudes toward
family life determine the effectiveness of birth control measures. Thus, even
though the P.R.C. has undertaken three campaigns of population limitation,
birth control efforts have had little effect, especially in rural areas, where 80 per
cent of the Chinese population still live. Even though some experts expect a
gradual decline in fertility and mortality in the next several decades, it is esti-
mated that China's population will increase to 1.3 billion by 1990.10
2. Education"
The shock of the Cultural Revolution did not interrupt the continuity of
Chinese scientific advancement in more applied fields.. Emphasis in scientific
research is placed on the innovative adaptation of currently available knowledge,
but there is also some basic research. The political ideology of the Communist
Party is the dominating influence in Chinese society, including science and
technology. The famous open public confession suffered by the chairman of
the Academy of Sciences, Mr. Kuo, and many other top intellectuals, has been
widely publicized,' 2 but many recent visitors feel that the impact of such ideolog-
ical attacks was not as great as anticipated.
Although scientific achievement escaped many of the effects of the Cultural
Revolution, the educational system in general suffered a loss of several years
stoppage in certain areas. 1 3 Even before the Cultural Revolution, the process
9 See Erisman, supra note 8, at 139-40.
10 Aird, Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's Republic of China, in ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT 220.
11 Orleans, China's Science and Technology: Continuity and Innovation, in ECONOmic ASSESSMIENT 185.12 Id. at 193.
31Id. at 219.
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of shortening China's precollege education had begun. Now only nine or ten
years are spent in preparation for college, while higher education typically
takes only two or three years, depending upon the field of study. More than 70
per cent of college study is now spent on professional education.
As a result, there were approximately 600,000 engineers and 110,000
scientists in China as of 1970. One of the most publicized achievements of
Chinese science and technology has been the construction of nuclear devices
and missiles for defense. More than ten nuclear weapons had been tested as
of 1972, and two satellites were put into orbit. The P.R.C. is eager to absorb the
advanced knowledge of the West, and this decade will see more exchange of in-
formation and contacts among scientists.
F. Growth of the Economy' 4
Estimates of China's growth rate between 1957 and 1970 vary from 3.1 per
cent per year (1.0 per cent on per capita basis) to 3.7 per cent (1.6 per cent per
capita). Such rates are low when compared to Taiwan (8.9 per cent, 5.8 per cent
per capita),Japan (10.5 per cent, 9.5 per cent per capita), Thailand (8.7 per cent,
5.4 per cent per capita), and South Korea (8.1 per cent, 5.3 per cent per capita).
China's growth rate is comparable to that of India (3.4 per cent, 1.2 per cent
per capita).
II
INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH CHINA
15
A. Pre-Sino-Soviet Rift: 1950-1959
After Mao's revolution, China looked to the communist bloc countries,
especially the U.S.S.R., for trading partners. The embargo imposed by Western
nations on certain materials at the time of the Korean War and the unwillingness
of many countries to extend export credits to the P.R.C. also contributed to the
early concentration of Chinese trade with the Soviet Union. Since rapid in-
dustrialization was a basic economic policy of the P.R.C., there were large-scale
imports of complete plants from the Soviet Union. Such construction agree-
ments between the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. during the 1950's totaled 291, in-
volving $3,275 million.' 6
How China financed those imports is an interesting question. Estimates of
the total amount of credit extended by the Soviet Union to China vary from
5,300 million rubles to 8,960 million rubles, depending upon the exchange rates
used and the interpretation of the loan agreement.17 When the export-import
14 Eckstein, Economic Development Prospects and Problems in China, 402 ANNALS 109 (1972);
Liu & Yeh, Chinese and Other Asian Economies: A Quantitative Evaluation, 63 AM. ECON. REV. PROC.
No. 2, at 215 (1973). See generally S. ISHIKAWA, NATIONAL INCOME FoRMuLATION IN MAINLAND
CHINA (1965); T. Liu & K. YEH, THE ECONOMY OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND: NATIONAL INCOME
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1933-59 (1965).
15 See generally A. ECKSTEIN, COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY (1966); F. MAH, THE FOREIGN TRADE OF MAINLAND CHINA (1971).
16 Price, International Trade of Communist China, 1950-62, in 2 ECONOMIC PROFILE 591.
7 See Eckstein, supra note 14, at 154-61.
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data are carefully analyzed, it appears that the Soviet Union became a net im-
porter from China as early as 1956. The total trade surplus of China during
1956-1963 was 5,360 million rubles, which was almost identical to the total Soviet
credit extended during 1950-1960. Thus it would seem likely that China fi-
nanced plant imports from the U.S.S.R. as a captive customer of the latter, sub-
ject to unfavorable terms of trade and stingy Soviet credit terms.18
China's trade flows during this period expanded from $350 million to $3
billion, and the Soviet Union accounted for about 70 per cent of P.R.C. trade.
Major items imported from the U.S.S.R. were machinery and equipment, while
China exported foodstuffs, raw materials, and consumer goods. Eastern Europe
also supplied machinery and equipment to China, and China reciprocated with
raw materials and foodstuffs. Some small trade surpluses with Asian communist
countries were, in reality, Chinese aid to those countries, but such aid repre-
sented less than 10 per cent of the total Chinese trade with communist countries.
China's trade with noncommunist countries during this period fell below one-
quarter of total P.R.C. trade and it reached barely 30 per cent in 1959.
B. The Shifting of Trading Partners: 1960-1965
The open conflict of mid-1960, climaxed by the U.S.S.R.'s withdrawal of
technical aid, prompted China to seek new trading partners in the early 1960's;
P.R.C. trade with the U.S.S.R. declined from $1.7 billion in 1960 to only $450
million in 1964. East European communist countries, with the exception of
Albania, sided with the U.S.S.R. in the conflict, so that China's trade with those
nations also declined from $645 million in 1960 to $160 million in 1964. Con-
comitantly, China's trade with noncommunist countries jumped from $1.37
billion in 1960 to $2.12 billion in 1964, while trade with Asian communist
countries increased from $310 million to almost $500 million. 19
During this period, China was forced for the first time to import large
quantities of grain, due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward. As China
shifted to its "agriculture first" policy, imports of chemical fertilizer were also
increased. Major exporters of grain to China were Canada and Australia, while
Japan and West European nations provided the bulk of imported chemical
fertilizers. China also began at this time to import complete plants from Japan
and Western Europe, along with technical assistance and credit extension.
These actions enabled China to have access to modern technology without re-
lying on the U.S.S.R. and other communist countries.
While there was a steady flow of grain import during the 1960's, there was
also substantial foodstuff export during the same period. Since the new strategy
emphasized the high yield Southern China farmland, China was able to export
'8 Usack & Batsavage, The International Trade of the People's Republic of China, in ECONOtIC
ASSESSMENT 345. During this period, the consumer goods imports declined from 12.8 per cent to
6.3 per cent while producer goods imports increased to 93.7 per cent by 1958. Exports of agricul-
tural products declined from 90.7 per cent in 1950 to 72.5 per cent in 1958. That means the in-
dustrial and mining products increased from 9.3 per cent to 27.5 per cent by 1958. However,
a more interesting change is the relative decline in raw agricultural products from 57.5 per cent to
35.5 per cent. See F. MAH, supra note 15, at 29.
19 Usack & Batsavage, supra note 18, at 347.
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rice from the South at the same time it was importing wheat for the wheat con-
suming Northern Chinese. This exchange was always to the advantage of rice
exporters because of the relatively high rice prices in the world market.
C. Trade During 1966-1970
The economic recovery from the disasters of the Great Leap Forward was
followed by the shock of the Cultural Revolution. By 1966, total P.R.C. trade
had reached its previous peak of $4.29 billion. The domestic disruptions of
the Cultural Revolution did not have a great impact on foreign trade even
though a 10 per cent reduction in trade was registered at the height of the Red
Guard activities in 1968. The restoration of order in 1969 permitted trade to
rise again, and it reached a record high of $4.5 billion in 1971.
The composition of trade commodities during this period reveals a signif-
icant shift from the import of foodstuffs to manufactures, especially iron, steel,
and nonferrous metals. Imports of iron and steel manufactures expanded from
$145 million in 1965 to $390 million in 1970, while imports of nonferrous
metals leaped from a mere $50 million to $210 million. On the export side, there
was very little change in composition: foodstuffs and crude materials ($1.08
billion in 1970), and chemicals and manufactures ($965 million in 1970), each
occupied around one-half of total exports.
20
There was continuous development in trade with the noncommunist world
in 1966-1970. Trade with developed countries in the noncommunist world in-
creased from 39 per cent in 1965 to 53 per cent in 1970. Total Chinese trade
with noncommunist countries exceeded 80 per cent by 1970. Sino-Soviet trade
was a negligible 1 per cent of China's trade with the outside world in 1970.
There was, however, a slight increase in trade with East European countries
from 1964 to 1970 (from 5 to 8 per cent of total Chinese trade), but it was still
well below the pre-Sino-Soviet rift peak of 1958.
D. The Balance of Trade: 1961-1971
1. Trade With Noncommunist Countries
Canada and Australia were successful in selling grains to China during the
1960's while they imported very little from China.21 Thus it is no wonder that
20 Id. at 354.
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BALANCE OF TRADE AGAINST NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
1961-1971
(in million U.S. dollars)
1961 1965
Export Import Net Export Import Net
EEC* 147.3 109.2 + 38.1 194.0 231.0 - 37.0
EFTAt 118.4 58.9 + 59.5 132.0 113.0 + 19.0
Japan 30.9 16.7 + 14.2 225.0 245.0 - 20.0
Australia 7.1 161.4 - 154.3 26.8 198.0 - 171.2
Canada 3.2 122.8 - 119.6 13.4 67.5 - 54.1
Hong Kong
and Macao 180.0 17.3 + 162.7 406.3 12.5 + 393.8
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Canada now strives to import from China in order to reduce its chronic trade
surplus. Similarly, Japan has been the major exporter of industrial output to
China, creating a substantial trade imbalance, so that the future of Sino-Japanese
trade depends upon Chinese exportation of more coking coal, petroleum, and
foodstuffs to Japan. With the worldwide shortage, China may refrain from pro-
viding resource-poor Japan with such Chinese products.
European countries, which export considerable amounts of industrial
products to China, are at a competitive disadvantage vis-i-vis Japan because of
the latter's lower transportation costs and greater demand for Chinese food-
stuffs and handicrafts. Nevertheless, the Chinese are eager to avoid reliance
on a single trade partner, so there is good reason to expect a continuous, mod-
erate growth of West European trade with China.
China's trade with less developed countries shows a continuous trade surplus,
but the total sum has been rather steady, around $800 million. The important
feature of this trade is that China exports manufactured products and imports
crude materials, mainly rubber and fiber. As a self-proclaimed champion of
the "Third World," China is eager to extend her influence through trading with
many countries in Southeast Asia, the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.
2. Trade With Communist Countries
The ideological conflict with the Soviet bloc has caused a drastic decline in
trade. Chinese imports from the U.S.S.R., which amounted to $954.6 million in
1959, dwindled to a meager $20 million in 1970. Chinese exports to the U.S.S.R.
were $1.1 billion in 1959, but dropped to only $25 million by 1970. Trade with
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria has also de-
clined, but not as drastically as Sino-Soviet trade. Trade with Romania, Albania,
and Cuba has either increased or been maintained at a steady rate.
E. China's Foreign Aid Program 22
China's foreign aid is aimed at consolidating and expanding its influence
over other communist and Third World countries. Accordingly, China has
extended aid to many less developed countries since 1956, especially since 1970.
Out of $2.2 billion in economic aid expended from 1956 to 1971, nearly 55 per
cent was spent during 1970 and 1971 alone. In 1971, $295 million in aid, out
1969 1971
Export Import Net Export Import Net
EEC* 268.5 297.9 - 29.4 272.0 323.0 - 51.0
EFTAt 160.0 171.8 - 11.8 152.0 183.6 - 31.6
Japan 234.0 390.0 - 156.0 322.0 578.0 - 256.0
Australia 33.6" 120.0 - 86.4 39.0 27.0 + 12.0
Canada 25.2 112.8 - 87.6 22.0 195.0 - 173.0
Hong Kong
and Macao 450.0 6.0 + 444.0 550.0 11.0 + 539.0
*European Economic Community.
tEuropean Free Trade Association (1970 data is used instead of 1971).
Source: compiled from tables in J. DELEYNE, THE CHINESE ECONOMY 159-60 (1973).
22 See Tansky, Chinese Foreign Aid, in ECONOMIC ASSESSMIENT 371.
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of a total $467 million, was given African countries. East Asian and South
Asian countries received $89 million. Although the total Chinese aid given in
1971-nearly half a billion dollars-was only about a quarter of U.S. aid, it is
a considerable amount relative to China's gross national product. Since 1970,
when Chinese aid increased substantially, the P.R.C. has even extended sup-
port to monarchies and anti-communist military juntas.23
Chinese aid has an immediate impact because of its nature. The Chinese al-
most always send commodities which the recipient countries can use at once to
attack pragmatic problems or trade deficits. The completion of the Tan-Zam
Railroad, a monumental contribution to the poor transportation systems of East
Africa, is an example. In contrast, billions of dollars of U.S. aid have been spent
without any visible consequences. Pursuant to the policy of providing solutions
to immediate problems, China has emphasized the sending of experts as part
of its aid program. In 1971, there were 18,700 Chinese economic technicians in
less developed countries.2 4
F. China's Trade With the United States
Since the current regime was established in 1950, the United States has
been the only country without official trading relationships with the P.R.C. As
such, there are no official statistics of trade with China covering the period from
1950 to 1971. Since the relaxation of trade barriers, the major exchange between
China and the U.S. has been of agricultural products. American exports to
China amounted to well over $0.7 billion in 1973, with the major commodities
being grains ($410 million), feed grains ($132 million), soybeans ($61 million),
and cotton ($100 million). In addition, China has imported hundreds of items,
such as hair, crude fur, and bristles, which appear to be ingredients for mer-
chandise in Chinese stores, although trade did not exceed $8 million for any
of these items.
The dramatic increase in Sino-American trade shown in Table III indicates
that the U.S. now recognizes the huge market China can provide for American
goods. As this article has indicated, the Chinese economy makes the P.R.C. a po-
tential trading partner of the United States in many areas other than agriculture.
Whether that potential will be realized will depend on the further development
of political relations as well as the solution of credit problems which will ensue,
should the 1973 trade imbalance be maintained.
TABLE III
U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
1972-197325
(in million U.S. dollars)
Export Import
1972 $ 61.3 $16.4
1973 575.0 21.4
23 Id. at 374.
24 Id. at 376.
25 The author is grateful to Dr. Melvin Skold for his assistance in obtaining data from the Foreign
Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
